Progressive Money

Topic 8 of 8

Housing

Why Australian housing became so expensive, and the competing explanations: interest rates and bank credit, planning and supply, tax settings, and the politics of a market most voters own a stake in.

3 lessons · about 6 min with activities, 3 h 40 min with the long lectures · beginner first

Before the videos

Key ideas for this topic

All three videos run an hour or more, so the primer below does more of the teaching than in other topics: read it first. Then watch Kohler for the history and the tax argument, Murray for the case that building more will not fix prices, and Keen on mortgage credit. If you only have time for one, watch the first 20 minutes or so of Kohler.

Builds on: Topic 3 showed that banks create money when they lend, and Topic 6 covered tax settings; housing is where bank credit, tax and land meet in most households' biggest purchase.

Ideas you'll need

1A house is both a home and an asset

When you buy a house you buy two things: somewhere to live, and an asset whose price can rise or fall. A renter pays only for the first. An owner also gains or loses as prices move.

In Sydney and Melbourne, much of what buyers pay is for the land and its location rather than the building. A house that costs roughly the same to build in a fringe suburb and close to the city can sell for very different prices, because the land under it differs.

Because housing is an asset, its price depends on what buyers can borrow, what they expect it to be worth later, and how it is taxed, as well as on how many homes exist. The Grattan Institute estimated in 2018 that house prices had more than doubled in real terms over the previous 20 years, far faster than incomes.

This is also why housing is politically hard. Most Australian households own their home. Lower prices would help renters and first-home buyers, but would cut the wealth of the many households who already own, and could strain banks whose loans are secured on housing. Keep both sides in view as you watch: each video is partly an argument about who should bear the cost of change.

2Interest rates and bank credit

Few people buy a house with cash. They borrow, and when a bank lends, it creates a new deposit that the buyer pays to the seller (see Topic 3). So the price buyers can pay depends heavily on how much banks will lend, which depends on interest rates and incomes.

A simple example: a household that can put $3,000 a month towards interest could carry a $600,000 interest-only loan at 6 per cent, but $1.2 million at 3 per cent. When rates fall, buyers can bid more, and in a market where homes are scarce, prices rise.

RBA researchers trace much of the rise in prices relative to incomes from the early 1990s to two changes: financial deregulation in the 1980s, and the shift to low inflation, which brought lower interest rates and let households borrow more for a given income. They judged in 2015 that this one-off adjustment had largely run its course. A later RBA model found that low interest rates, partly reflecting lower world interest rates, explained much of the rapid rise in prices in the years before 2019.

Steve Keen goes further, arguing that the growth of mortgage credit itself drives prices. Most economists see credit and prices pushing each other along.

3The supply argument at its strongest

The supply argument runs like this. State planning rules and council zoning limit how many homes can be built, especially in established suburbs near jobs and transport. When demand rises, from population growth, higher incomes or cheaper credit, those limits mean prices rise instead of more homes being built.

RBA researchers Ross Kendall and Peter Tulip estimated that in 2016 zoning pushed detached house prices above the cost of supplying them by 73 per cent in Sydney, 69 in Melbourne, 54 in Perth and 42 in Brisbane. They were careful to say this is not how far prices would fall without zoning. The Grattan Institute estimated that building an extra 50,000 homes a year for a decade could leave prices 5 to 20 per cent lower than otherwise, and argues planning reform is the biggest long-run lever.

Building also depends on workers, materials and finance. The National Housing Supply and Affordability Council forecast in 2025 that Australia would build 938,000 new homes in the five years to mid-2029, 262,000 short of the 1.2 million target, citing labour shortages, high material costs, high interest rates and, in some places, restrictive planning.

Supply advocates rarely claim building is the only answer. Their point is that without more homes, other policies mostly change who gets the homes that exist.

4Tax settings: negative gearing and the capital gains discount

Two tax settings come up in almost every housing debate.

  • Negative gearing lets an investor whose rental property costs more to hold, mostly in interest, than it earns in rent deduct the loss from other income such as wages, lowering their tax.
  • The capital gains tax discount, in place since September 1999, taxes only half the gain on an asset held for more than a year. It replaced a system that taxed gains after adjusting for inflation.

Critics such as Kohler argue that together these encouraged investors to accept losses while chasing lightly taxed capital gains, adding to demand. Others, including Murray, think their effect on prices was modest. The Grattan Institute, which favoured reform, estimated in 2016 that halving the discount and limiting negative gearing would leave prices up to 2 per cent lower than otherwise.

These settings are now changing, under measures announced in the May 2026 Budget and passed by Parliament in June 2026. From 1 July 2027, losses on established homes bought after 12 May 2026 can no longer be deducted against wages; properties already held, and new builds, keep negative gearing. Also from 1 July 2027, the 50 per cent discount gives way to an inflation adjustment with a minimum 30 per cent tax, for gains that accrue from that date; the change applies to most assets held by individuals and trusts, including shares, not only property; investors in new builds can choose the old discount instead. All three videos were recorded before these changes.

5Speculation, winners and losers, and three kinds of fix

Housing markets also run on expectations. When buyers expect prices to keep rising, they stretch to get in before it is too late, and their buying pushes prices up, which seems to confirm the expectation until conditions change. That is what economists mean by speculation, and it is one reason house prices move in long booms and slumps.

Proposed fixes fall roughly into three groups:

  • Add supply: planning reform, more construction workers and better building methods, and government building.
  • Reduce demand driven by credit or tax: tax changes and limits on risky lending.
  • Change who gets the homes we have: public or community housing, rent rules, and help with rent.

The videos favour different mixes. Kohler stresses tax and a long period of flat prices; Murray stresses public home ownership and rent limits; Keen stresses credit. As you watch, ask of each claim: is it about what caused high prices, about what would lower them, or about who should bear the cost?

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Lesson 8.1 Beginner62 min video Long lecture · optional about 1 h 10 min with questions

Webinar Series: The Great Divide: Australia's housing mess and how to fix it. With Alan Kohler

Alan Kohler · Per Capita Australia

Before you watch

After watching this video, you should be able to explain how negative gearing and the capital gains discount combine, and why Kohler blames them for prices outpacing incomes.

Why this matters. These two tax settings were at the centre of housing politics for a decade, and both change from July 2027. Kohler explains why critics targeted them, and his account shows what a tax-centred story can miss.

Webinar Series: The Great Divide: Australia's housing mess and how to fix it. With Alan Kohler
Play: Webinar Series: The Great Divide: Australia's housing mess and how to fix it. With Alan Kohler (62 minutes, opens YouTube)

A 62-minute Per Capita webinar, recorded in late 2023, in which finance journalist Alan Kohler discusses his Quarterly Essay The Great Divide. He shows house prices rising from about three and a half times incomes to seven or eight times, dates the break to around 2000, and blames mainly the 1999 capital gains tax discount working with negative gearing, along with federal policies that add to demand while states and councils restrict supply. Kohler is a journalist rather than an economist, which makes him clear but means his single-cause story needs testing; the first 20 minutes or so carry the core argument.

Three things to remember

  1. Established Australian house prices rose much faster than incomes from the late 1990s. The Grattan Institute estimated in 2018 that prices had more than doubled in real terms over 20 years.
  2. Argument Kohler argues that the 1999 capital gains discount supercharged negative gearing, so investors accepted years of rental losses to chase half-taxed gains, and that this, more than anything, explains the break around 2000.
  3. Argument Kohler argues governments should set a target for the ratio of house prices to incomes and hold prices roughly flat for many years while incomes catch up, with fast rail opening up cheaper land.

Can you explain it?

Optional. Try as often as you like; nothing is scored or sent anywhere.

An investor sells an established rental property held for five years, making a $300,000 capital gain, all of it accrued before July 2027, so the 50 per cent discount applies. How much of the gain is added to their taxable income?

Show the working

Answer: $150,000

Under the discount, only half of the gain on an asset held more than 12 months is taxed: $300,000 × 50% = $150,000, taxed at the investor's marginal rate. From 1 July 2027, gains accruing after that date are instead adjusted for inflation, with a minimum 30 per cent tax (new-build investors can choose the old discount).

Kohler says the 1999 tax change was the one thing that happened around 2000. Which other explanation for prices outpacing incomes does RBA research give most weight?

Show the answer

Lower inflation and interest rates after financial deregulation, which let households borrow more for a given income.

Right. RBA researchers link the rise in prices relative to incomes from the early 1990s to deregulation and the shift to low inflation, which lowered interest rates and raised borrowing capacity.

Lesson 8.2 Intermediate63 min video Long lecture · optional about 1 h 10 min with questions

Cameron Murray - The Great Housing Hijack | Australia's Biggest Book Club

Cameron Murray · The Australia Institute

Before you watch

After watching this video, you should be able to explain Murray's 'asset price equilibrium' argument and why he thinks planning reform alone will not make housing much cheaper.

Why this matters. Murray is the best-known Australian economist sceptical of the supply story, and his proposals for rent limits and public home ownership are in active debate. Testing his argument against the supply research sharpens your view of both.

Cameron Murray - The Great Housing Hijack | Australia's Biggest Book Club
Play: Cameron Murray - The Great Housing Hijack | Australia's Biggest Book Club (63 minutes, opens YouTube)

A 63-minute Australia Institute book club, recorded in March 2024, in which economist Cameron Murray discusses his book The Great Housing Hijack with Greg Jericho. He argues that prices and rents are tied to the wider economy by market forces that planning reform cannot override, and proposes limits on how fast rents can rise plus 'Housemate', a Singapore-style scheme selling discounted homes to people who do not own one. The first 20 minutes or so set out his core economics; rent controls come next, then the Housing Australia Future Fund and, from about 45 minutes, Housemate. It is the most challenging video here because it disputes the view of most housing economists.

Three things to remember

  1. Argument Murray argues housing is an asset priced against other investments: if prices fell far below what rents justify, investors would buy until returns matched other assets again, so no policy can simply halve prices.
  2. Established RBA research estimated that in 2016 zoning pushed Sydney detached house prices 73 per cent above the cost of supplying them, while warning that this is not how far prices would fall without zoning.
  3. Argument Murray proposes 'Housemate', a large Singapore-style scheme selling new homes at a discount to people who do not own one, plus limits on how fast rents can rise, smoothing big increases over several years.

Can you explain it?

Optional. Try as often as you like; nothing is scored or sent anywhere.

A Newcastle tenant pays $500 a week, and the landlord wants $625 at renewal. Under the kind of rent limit Murray supports, what would happen?

Show the answer

The increase would be spread over several years, with each year's rise capped.

Right. Murray supports 'modern' rent controls that limit how fast rents rise, for example to inflation plus a few per cent, so a 25 per cent jump arrives over about three years instead of at once.

Murray says prices cannot fall by half without investors buying back in. How would a supporter of the supply argument reply?

Show a model answer

A supply advocate would agree that housing is priced as an asset and that prices will not halve. But they would say more homes relative to the population lower rents, and because prices reflect expected rents and interest rates, lower rents mean prices lower than they would otherwise be. RBA research finds zoning keeps prices well above the cost of supply in the big cities, and Grattan estimated an extra 50,000 homes a year for a decade could leave prices 5 to 20 per cent lower. The aim is 'lower than otherwise', not a crash.

A strong answer

  • Agreement that prices will not halve
  • More supply lowers rents, which feed into prices
  • Evidence that zoning keeps prices above the cost of supply

Lesson 8.3 Intermediate69 min video Long lecture · optional about 1 h 15 min with questions

What Economists Aren't Telling Us About the Property Market | Steve Keen, Economist

Steve Keen · The Elephant In The Room Property Podcast

Before you watch

After watching this video, you should be able to explain why Keen links changes in house prices to the acceleration of mortgage credit, not just its level.

Why this matters. Most Australian home buyers borrow, so bank lending and house prices are tightly bound together. This lesson links the Banks & debt topic to housing and asks how far credit is a cause and how far an effect.

What Economists Aren't Telling Us About the Property Market | Steve Keen, Economist
Play: What Economists Aren't Telling Us About the Property Market | Steve Keen, Economist (69 minutes, opens YouTube)

A 69-minute episode of The Elephant in the Room, an Australian property podcast, recorded in 2022 as interest rates began to rise. Keen argues that house price changes are driven by the acceleration of mortgage credit, that governments have repeatedly propped up prices with buyer grants, and that high household debt leaves the market fragile; the hosts, a buyers' agent and a mortgage broker, push back. After a short opening detour into climate economics, the core housing argument runs for roughly the next 20 minutes; the rest ranges over a debt jubilee, government debt and climate change before returning to housing at the end.

Three things to remember

  1. Established When a bank approves a mortgage, it creates a new deposit rather than lending out existing savings. The Bank of England set this out plainly in 2014, and central banks generally agree.
  2. Argument Keen argues that new mortgage lending is the main source of money spent on housing, so rising prices need mortgage debt to keep accelerating, which gets harder as household debt climbs relative to incomes.
  3. Argument Keen argues that first home buyer grants mainly lift sellers' prices, and that Australia avoided a deep price fall after 2008 because governments boosted those grants and propped up the market.

Can you explain it?

Optional. Try as often as you like; nothing is scored or sent anywhere.

A household can afford $3,000 a month in interest on an interest-only loan. At 6 per cent it can borrow $600,000. How much could it borrow at 3 per cent?

Show the working

Answer: $1,200,000

$3,000 a month is $36,000 a year. At 6 per cent, $36,000 ÷ 0.06 = $600,000. At 3 per cent, $36,000 ÷ 0.03 = $1,200,000. Halving the interest rate doubles what the household can borrow. When many buyers can borrow more, they bid more, which is one route by which falling rates and expanding credit push up prices.

Keen says it is not the level of mortgage debt, or even its growth, but its acceleration that matters for house price changes. Which situation would he expect to slow price growth?

Show the answer

Mortgage debt is still growing, but each month more slowly than the month before.

Right. Debt is still rising, but the flow of new credit into housing is shrinking. In Keen's account, that deceleration is what slows price growth.

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Continue learning

That completes the eight topics; next, the comparative pathway on how mainstream economists think and where MMT disagrees sets the site's main debates side by side.

Next: where this topic is contested

The big debate in this topic

Should housing policy focus on building more homes, or on reducing demand?

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Where this leads. Next comes the comparative pathway on how mainstream economists think and where MMT disagrees, followed by real-world scenarios that test what you have learned.

Go further (optional, more advanced)